Kreps and wilson 1982
Webon rational strategic behavior;5 e.g., Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) applied Sard’s Theorem and the Regular Value Theorem in di erential topology to study equilibrium distribu-tions over terminal nodes and the generic niteness of equilibria components (see also Blume and Zame Web1 aug. 1982 · JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 27, 245-252 (1982) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma DAVID M. KREPS Graduate …
Kreps and wilson 1982
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WebWikipedia Web1 nov. 2024 · The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), while formally well defined in a wider class of games, are explicitly …
Web人类的进步离不开经济的增长,信任与经济增长密切相关(Fukuyama, 1995; Knack 和Keefer, 1997; 张维迎,柯荣住,本书)。. 因为经济增长很大程度上基于分工的发展,这是亚当·斯密从一开始就讲的基本定理,而如果没有信任,社会分工和专业化的发展是不可能的 ... http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/60452/1/ECTH-D-19-00288_R2%20%285%29.pdf
Webhavior in repeated complete information games studied by Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990). Existing works that study players’ behaviors in reputation games focus on finite-horizon games or re-strict attention to particular equilibria or particular payoff structures. For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) Web不完备偏好扩展式博弈的序贯均衡,序贯博弈,序贯均衡,序贯分析,序贯疗法,序贯治疗,雌孕激素序贯疗法,序贯决策,序贯蒙特卡 ...
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WebDavid M. Kreps Robert Butler Wilson Abstract No abstract is available for this item. Suggested Citation Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. " Reputation and imperfect information ," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27 (2), pages 253-279, August. Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:253-279 as cottonwood tank azWeb16 okt. 2004 · Recent game theory has made use of the notion of a player's reputation in efforts to explain cooperation in iterated plays of games such as the prisoner's dilemma (Kreps and Wilson 1982). In many repeated prisoner dilemma games it pays to have a reputation to be cooperative. breckland bus passWebSequential Equilibrium (Kreps-Wilson, 1982) Beliefs At any information set that is reached, player must form beliefs regarding which node he is at For every node y; (y) must assign … breckland cancerWebThe first papers to model the reputation idea were Kreps and Wilson [1982], Milgrom and Roberts [1982], and the “Gang of Four” paper Kreps, ... and R. Wilson [1982] “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27:245-252, 486-502. Lehrer, E. [1988] “Repeated games with ... cottonwood tavern gatlinburg falls resortWebFor a finite extensive form game we use the notation of Kreps and Wilson (1982). There is a finite set of nodes, partially ordered by a precedence relation, and partitioned into terminal nodes Z and decision nodes X. The set of terminal nodes succeeding x is Z(x), and Z(E) 5 < x[EZ(x). There breckland carbon auditWebKreps, D.M. and Wilson, R. (1982) Sequential Equilibrium. Econometrica, 50, 863-894. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1912767 has been cited by the following article: TITLE: Local … cottonwood swimming pool colorado springsWeb22 nov. 2024 · David M. Kreps, Robert Wilson We propose a new criterion for equilibria of extensive games, in the spirit of Selten's perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that … cottonwood table top